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1. Introduction
Fundamental changes in the US legal environment during the past 15 years have reshaped
how firms protect and enforce their intellectual property rights. Most notable among these changes
was the 1982 formation of a centralized appellate court, the Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit, which ushered in a “pro-patent” legal environment in the United States. Despite this
strengthening of US patent rights and a perceived increased importance of patents, recent survey
evidence suggests that US manufacturing firms in most industries rely more heavily on secrecy and
lead time to recoup their R&D investments than they do on legal mechanisms such as patents and
that, if anything, the effectiveness of patents as a means of appropriating R&D returns has
declined since the early 1980s (Cohen et al. 1997).
1 Even more surprising, this reported decline in
the effectiveness of patents has coincided with a recent and unprecedented surge in the overall
number of US patents applied for and granted to firms each year (Kortum and Lerner 1997).
This paper examines this “patent paradox” more closely by exploring the role of patents in
the semiconductor industry, where the gap between the relative ineffectiveness of patents (as
reported in surveys) and their widespread use is particularly striking. For example, semiconductor
firms reported a below-average level of effectiveness for patents in the 1994 “Carnegie-Mellon
survey” (Cohen et al. 1997) and, in fact, appear to rely much more heavily on secrecy than they did
in the influential “Yale appropriability survey” conducted in 1983 (Levin et al. 1987).
2 At the same
time, the past decade has witnessed a surge in the number of US patents involving semiconductor
technologies, surpassing the overall increase in US patenting during this period reported by Kortum
and Lerner (1997).
3 The propensity of semiconductor firms to patent has likewise risen
dramatically over this period: patenting per million 1992 real R&D dollars in the semiconductor
industry doubled between 1982 and 1992, from about 0.3 to 0.6. During the same period, the
patent yield for manufacturing as a whole was fairly stagnant and that for pharmaceuticals actually
declined (see Figure 1).
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The purpose of this paper is to address a simple question: If semiconductor firms do not
rely heavily on patents to recoup their R&D investments (as they have claimed in prior surveys),
then why are these firms patenting so aggressively? The semiconductor industry provides an
excellent setting within which to examine the effects of stronger patent rights on firms engaged in
“cumulative systems” technologies (Scotchmer 1991; Merges and Nelson 1990; Merges 1996).
Much like multimedia or computer firms, semiconductor firms often require access to a “thicket”
of intellectual property rights owned by a diverse set of entities in order to advance the technology3
or simply to produce their products (Merges 1996). Because the pace of technology is rapid and
numerous industry participants exist, any new product or process will often overlap with
technologies developed, either in parallel or in the past, by an array of external parties (Grindley
and Teece 1997). As such, we also hope to shed light on more fundamental, but difficult questions:
what are the effects of stronger patent rights in industries characterized by cumulative innovation,
rapid change, and multiple owners of overlapping technology rights? Does strengthening the patent
system in such industries promote innovation or hinder it?
Our study consists of two complementary research components. First, in order to
understand the factors that underpin a firm’s decision to patent and how these might differ across
firms in this industry, we met with patent managers and executives from several types of
semiconductor firms, including large manufacturers and smaller firms that have entered the
industry during the past decade. We used these interviews to explore issues that are difficult to
track with publicly available sources (e.g., changes in internal management practices or an
increased reliance on trade secrets) and to understand the technological and contractual
environment within which these firms operate. Although the interviews are not necessarily
representative of industry-wide practices, they capture a cross-section of views on the role of
patents, their use, and their perceived effects on innovation in this industry that enable us to
unravel the somewhat perplexing findings of recent studies in this field.
Drawing on the insights gained from these interviews, the second part of our study
analyzes the patent strategies of a much larger set of semiconductor firms over a twenty year
period, or before and after the strengthening of US patent rights took place. We first identify the
universe of approximately 100 publicly-traded, US firms whose principal line of business is
semiconductors and related devices (SIC3674) and whose R&D expenditures are therefore
primarily directed towards semiconductor-related areas. We then compile a detailed database of
these firms’ patent portfolios from 1975 to 1996 and match these data with other financial
variables from Compustat (e.g., R&D, sales, and capital expenditures) that are known
determinants of patenting in general
5 and that capture key variables identified in our interviews.
There are several advantages of this approach. First, unlike recent studies, we are able to
construct reliable estimates of changes in the patent propensities of these firms over this twenty-
year period while keeping the broad technological area constant across firms.
6 Second, we are able
to examine whether the patterns we observe are simply driven by a change in the mix of firms in
the industry over time (i.e., the effects of entry and exit). The main drawback of our approach is4
that we exclude large “systems” manufacturers (such as IBM, AT&T or Motorola, and non-US
firms such as Toshiba or Samsung) that are important patent owners and users of semiconductor
technologies, but for which we lack reliable estimates of R&D investment targeted at
semiconductor technologies.
Our results demonstrate that US semiconductor firms are indeed patenting aggressively:
not only has their overall propensity to patent increased dramatically during the “pro-patent” era,
but this increase far exceeds that of US manufacturers as a whole. Our interviews suggest that
these “patent portfolio races” are quite different from the models envisioned by the classic “patent
7 Instead of being driven by a desire to win strong legal rights to a standalone
technological prize, these firms are driven by broader motives: with large sunk costs in
manufacturing facilities and a need to draw on process and product technologies invented (and
patented) by a diverse array of parties, manufacturers amass large patent portfolios of their own,
largely to avoid being excluded or “held up” by other parties. Although patents still perform their
traditional function of safeguarding against outright theft and infringement of these firms’
inventions, this classical role of patents seems to be dominated by a broader use of patents as
“legal bargaining chips” that enable the firms to avoid being excluded in a particular field of use,
to obtain more favorable terms to their licensing agreements, to safeguard against costly patent
litigation, or to gain access to external technologies on more favorable terms of trade.
8 Although
the “strategic” use of patents has been widely noted (e.g., Cohen et al. 1997; Parr and Sullivan,
1996) and clearly demonstrated in other accounts of the semiconductor and electronics industries
(Grindley and Teece 1997), the broader prevalence of such behavior and the extent to which it has
increased during the “pro-patent” era in the United States have not yet been empirically examined.
Our analysis represents an important step in that direction.
Our results also suggest that firms that entered the industry after 1982 appear to patent
more aggressively than pre-1982 entrant firms, relative to what we would expect based on their
size and R&D spending. Our interviews suggest that stronger patent rights were important to these
firms (about half of which are design firms, specializing in product innovation) in attracting
venture capital funds and securing proprietary rights in niche product markets; it is less clear that
ownership of strong patent rights was important to these firms in licensing their technologies or in
managing their vertical relationships with suppliers of manufacturing services.
9 These results
contrast with those of other studies where entrant firms are shown to rely more heavily on trade5
secrecy and therefore “opt out” of the patent systems because of their relative disadvantage in
asserting and defending those rights in court (Lerner 1994, 1995; Lanjouw 1994).
The paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we briefly lay out the institutional
shift that took place in the United States during the early 1980s and discuss previous empirical
studies that examine its effects. We focus on three main hypotheses generated by Kortum and
Lerner (1997) that are central to our analysis. We then draw on recent theoretical literature to
refine the hypotheses in ways that better reflect the contractual dilemmas posed by strengthening
patent rights in an industry characterized by rapid technological change, cumulative innovation,
and overlapping property rights. In Section 3, we discuss the results from our field interviews that
shed light on the changing incentives to patent and that highlight differences among firms. Section
4 contains the empirical analysis, describes the data we constructed, and explains the methods we
used. We also discuss our econometric results in this section. In Section 5, we explore alternative
hypotheses and identify next steps in our research. Section 6 concludes.
2.  The Strengthening of US Patent Rights and Its Effects
The patent system has long been recognized as an important policy instrument used to
promote innovation and technological progress. Two fundamental mechanisms underpin the patent
system. First, an inventor discloses to the public a “novel”, “useful”, and “non-obvious” invention.
In return, the inventor receives the right to exclude others from using that invention for a fixed
period of time (now 20 years from the date of patent application in the United States). The rules of
the patent game may differ from country to country (e.g., whether rights are assigned to the first
inventor or the first to file the patent application), but the underlying principle remains the same.
By providing exclusionary rights for some period of time and a more conducive environment in
which to recoup R&D investments, the patent system aims to encourage inventors to direct more of
their resources toward R&D than would otherwise be the case. At the same time, detailed
information about the invention is disclosed to the public when the patent application is published.
Although governmental agencies (in the United States, the US Patent and Trademark
Office) examine applications and decide whether an invention qualifies for patent protection, the
courts ultimately determine the strength of patent rights once granted. By deciding whether a patent
is valid or whether another party has infringed on the patent owner’s rights, courts play a pivotal
role in determining the strength (and hence, the value) of patent rights. Patent rights alone may be6
insufficient to enable the inventor to profit from the invention, but stronger patent rights may tilt
the scale in favor of patent owners.
 
2.1. The “Pro-Patent” shift in the US Legal Environment
Several important changes took place in the US legal environment during the early 1980s
that collectively strengthened the rights conferred on US patent owners, regardless of whether these
owners were independent inventors, universities, or firms. The pendulum started to swing in 1980,
when the US Supreme Court reversed its stance on the patent-antitrust interface and endorsed
exclusive, strong patent rights in promoting innovation and investment.
10 The renewed faith in
intellectual property rights was echoed in legislative initiatives in the early 1980s, a period during
which US firms faced increased competition from foreign firms, many of whom had improved their
abilities to exploit advances made in U.S. R&D laboratories. First, the Bayh-Dole Act of 1980
eased restrictions on federal agencies when granting licenses to small businesses and non-profits
for patents based on federally-funded research. Second, antitrust laws were relaxed in 1984 in
hopes of encouraging firms to cooperate with one another in “pre-commercial” research projects.
11
A third legislative initiative was specifically aimed at improving the ability of semiconductor firms
to prevent unauthorized copying and use of their semiconductor layout designs. More specifically,
the Semiconductor Chip Protection Act of 1984 created a new sui generis form of intellectual
property rights (conceptually similar to copyright) for the layout, or “mask work”, of
semiconductors.
12
No other event solidified this “pro-patent” shift in the United States more than the 1982
creation of the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (CAFC), a specialized appellate court with
jurisdiction over patent cases.
13 The driving force behind the creation of the CAFC was a lack of
uniformity among US courts in interpreting the patent statute.
14 In addition to unifying US patent
doctrine, the CAFC established a number of procedural and substantive rules that strengthened the
enforceability of patent rights (Merges 1997; Lerner 1995; Taylor and Higgins 1994). For
example, the court made it more difficult to challenge a patent’s validity,
15 was more willing to
grant an injunction against an infringer (Lanjouw and Lerner 1996), and increased the penalties on
infringers by awarding higher damages in patent disputes (Merges 1997; Kortum and Lerner
1997). Plaintiff success rates in patent infringement suits also increased substantially during this
period (Lerner 1995).
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2.2 The effects of strong patent rights revisited.
The effects of stronger patent rights on the intensity with which firms patent remains
unclear.
17 To the extent that stronger patent rights enable firms to recoup more of their R&D
dollars, stronger patent rights should increase incentives to invest in R&D.
 18 In this scenario, there
is little reason to suspect that these increased R&D dollars should yield proportionally more
patents. Thus, unless other changes in the R&D process itself occur (such as a shift toward more
“applied,” patentable activities or improvements in research methods that speed or ease the
inventive process), stronger patent rights should not generate an increase in the numbers of patents
generated per R&D dollar.
A longstanding literature in the innovation and economics literatures has established,
however, that the effectiveness of patents varies greatly across industries and technological areas
(Scherer 1959; Taylor and Silberston 1973; Mansfield 1986), and that firms in only a handful of
industries, such as pharmaceuticals and chemicals, rely heavily on patents to recoup their R&D
investments (Levin et al. 1987).
19 Thus we might expect that the simple argument elucidated above
does not always apply, since the primary motivation for patenting in many industries may not be
directly related to protecting investments in R&D. For example, some studies suggest that stronger
patent rights have simply enabled firms with large legal departments to extract rents from and deter
entry by other firms in the industry. Lerner (1994) shows that small firms are far more likely to
“opt out” of the patent system entirely and rely more heavily on formal trade secret mechanisms to
protect their inventions. In another study, Lerner (1995) shows that new biotechnology firms
“avoid the shadows” of competitors, but by patenting in areas that are not already occupied by
firms better-positioned to enforce their patent rights in court. In a similar vein, Lanjouw (1994)
finds that the value associated with patents also differs across firms, simply because of the “true”
value of patents are often not revealed until such rights are held valid by the courts, a process that
places a disproportionate burden on poorly capitalized firms.
The findings of two recent studies are especially important for the arguments in this paper.
Kortum and Lerner (1997) explore whether the strengthening of US patent rights in the early 1980s
led to the unprecedented surge in US patenting over the past decade. They identify four possible
causes and reject all but the last using evidence on worldwide patenting in many technologies:
• The “friendly court” hypothesis, which would imply a rush to patent in the
United States versus other countries that has not occurred.8
• The “regulatory capture” hypothesis, which implies that incumbent large firms
should be leading the surge.
• The “fertile technology” hypothesis, which implies that the increase in
patenting should be concentrated in certain technology classes such as biotechnology and
software.
• Changes in the management of R&D that lead to increases in R&D
productivity (e.g., in biotech, see Arora and Gambardella 1994) and a shift to more applied
activities has increased the yield of patentable discoveries.
Based on our interviews, we would modify the conclusions of Kortum and Lerner in two
ways: first, it is clear from talking to semiconductor firms that regulatory capture (implying a more
aggressive use of intellectual property rights by large firms with deep pockets) could easily cause a
strategic response among non-patenting small and medium-sized firms and entrants as they attempt
to negotiate licensing or cross-licensing agreements on more favorable terms. If this is true,
regulatory capture does not necessarily imply that large incumbent firms will have a greater
incentive to patent than new entrants to the industry.
Second, we consider changes in the “management of R&D” more broadly. Even with no
change to the strategy and goals of their R&D programs, it was clear from our conversations that
many firms had decided to “harvest” more patents from their R&D, both as a defensive strategy
and to assist them in winning favorable terms in cross-licensing negotiations with other firms in the
industry.
20 Thus we agree that the increase in patenting in the semiconductor industry arises partly
from a shift in the management of R&D, but we do not believe that the shift is solely explained by
a move toward more applied R&D. Instead, our interviews suggest that many firms in this industry
increased their propensity to patent in response to an increasing threat of “hold-up” when they are
sued for infringement. The threat has increased because patents are more likely to be upheld and
because the nature of innovation in this industry has become more complex and depends on
technological inputs from more actors.
A second relevant study is the Carnegie-Mellon Survey of Industrial R&D in the United
States (Cohen, Nelson, and Walsh 1996, 1997). This survey found that patents were a relatively
ineffectual mechanism by which firms in the semiconductor industry recoup R&D investments
(both in absolute terms and relative to firms in other industries) and that firms now rely more
heavily on secrecy than they did in the early 1980s. Based on a sample of 14 responses in the9
“semiconductor and related equipment” industry, Cohen et al. (1996) report that the ranking of
appropriability mechanisms for product innovation in decreasing order of importance is 1) product
complexity; 2) secrecy; 3) lead time; 4) complementary sales and service; 5) complementary
manufacturing; with patents and other legal means a distant sixth and seventh.
21 The ranking for
process innovations was similar, although patents were found to be even less effective for this kind
of innovation.
A somewhat smaller sample of respondents (11) in this industry answered a series of
questions about the reasons for patenting in their industry.
22 The most important reasons for
patenting product innovations were to prevent copying and to block another firm patenting a
related innovation, followed by use in negotiations and prevention of infringement suits. Except for
copying, these reasons are consistent with what our interviewees told us. For process patents, the
ranking was similar, although use in negotiations was somewhat less important.
The Carnegie-Mellon results confirm that in many industries, the prevention of imitation is
only one of several reasons for patenting. Although the authors note that the broader use of patents
may be especially important in industries where innovation is incremental (and where the value of a
single patents is inherently tied to the value of other patented and unpatented developments), they
do not examine these effects explicitly. They summarize their results as follows:
“The picture that emerges from our results is that the prevention of imitation is
only one of several reasons for patenting. The motive of blocking as well as the
prominent motives of the prevention of suits and use in negotiations suggest that
patents are used more broadly than simply to protect the returns to a specific
innovation.” (Cohen et al. 1997: p. 17).
Summing up the results of this recent research on the motives for patenting, some
questions still remain: if firms rely more heavily on trade secrecy and lead time to profit from
innovation, then why do they patent so aggressively? Have firms redirected more of their research
portfolios toward applied projects or improved their management of the innovation process
(Kortum and Lerner 1998)? Or, have patents simply become more important “bargaining chips” to
firms in their efforts to craft favorable licensing deals and to keep potential litigants at bay (Cohen
et al. 1997)? And how does the use of patents vary among firms in the same industry?
3. Field Interviews
In order to illuminate the factors that have influenced semiconductor firms’ increased
propensity to patent and the effect, if any, of the “pro-patent” shift on different types of firms, we10
first met with patent managers and executives from two types of semiconductor firms:
23 (1)
incumbent firms and (2) firms that entered the semiconductor industry since 1982, after the shift to
a “pro-patent” environment. As shown in Table A.2, the sample includes large and medium-sized
semiconductor manufacturers, who are engaged in both process and product innovation, as well as
smaller design firms, who are engaged primarily in product innovation.
24 Only one of the firms,
Texas Instruments, held a large patent portfolio (both in absolute terms and relative to its R&D
spending) prior to the shift in US patent policies.
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3.1.  Patents as an appropriability mechanism
Are patents important to firms in the semiconductor industry? In general, the answer to
this question was “yes, patents are extremely important.” But the reasons for their importance
often had little to do with whether patents provide an incentive to conduct R&D or enable the firm
to profit from the current-generation products. As one interviewee noted, “semiconductor firms do
not rely on patents [to profit from innovation or appropriate returns from R&D], but patent rights
are still of critical importance to firms in this industry.”
Consistent with the findings of the Carnegie Mellon survey and earlier studies on how
firms profit from innovation in the semiconductor and other industries
26, interviewees noted that
semiconductor firms generally rely on mechanisms other than patents to profit from innovation.
Because of the short product life cycles in this industry and the fact that competitive advantage is
largely driven by lead time, design complexity, and (for manufacturers) superior manufacturing
capabilities, patents are a relatively ineffective means by which to profit from inventions—at least
for current-generation products. For example, it takes 18 months on average for a patent to issue in
the United States, while the average life cycle of semiconductor products ranges from a year to 16
months. Occasionally, successor generations of products will incorporate the older technology
embodied in the patent, but even this period might last 4-6 years, which is far less than the 20 year
life of the patent. As we note below, however, the longer-term value of these patents can be quite
high if future generations of products build on the patented technology, this technology becomes
widely used by other firms, and alternative methods are difficult or prohibitively costly to adopt.
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Interviewees highlighted another aspect of patenting in semiconductor technologies that
affects the ability of patents to exclude competitors. Unlike many biotechnology or pharmaceutical
products, for example, a given semiconductor product (say, a new ethernet card or a memory
device) will likely be covered by hundreds if not thousands of individual patents that cover aspects
of the circuitry design, materials used to achieve a certain outcome, and the broad array of methods11
used to manufacture the device. It is difficult, therefore, for firms to rely on a single patent or set of
patents to entirely exclude rivals from a given product line. Interviewees noted that although firms
can and often do obtain webs of related patents surrounding critical technologies, a single patent is
generally far less critical to a product’s success than is true in biotechnology or pharmaceuticals.
The maze of patents embodied in a typical semiconductor product was also identified as
one of the reasons that patents are especially valuable to semiconductor firms as “bargaining
chips.” A single firm rarely owns all the rights (either based on its own patents or licensing
agreements) to technologies embodied in a new product; as such, it is important to have assets with
which to trade in the event that other patent owners assert their rights against the firm. Because of
the complexity of semiconductor manufacturing, the diverse range of technologies employed in the
wafer fabrication process and the rapid depreciation of high-volume fabs, firms that operate and
own state-of-the-art manufacturing facilities (fabs) appear to face a greater need to bargain with
other holders of patent rights than is true of design firms, which tend to specialize in product
innovation.
Ironically, the rapid pace of technological change and short product life cycles that
characterize the semiconductor industry appear to increase rather than diminish these firms’
incentives to patent. If product life cycles were longer, firms would need to think more carefully
about whether competitors could benefit from the information disclosed in the patent application
and would perhaps protect a broader range of inventions with trade secrecy instead. As one
executive noted, “If we relied on patents for technical information, we would quickly go out of
business.” Thus, on the one hand, short product life cycles tend to undermine the ability of firms in
this industry to rely exclusively on patents to profit from inventions on a given generation of
products. On the other hand, because patent rights extend across generations of products and
technologies and invention in this field is highly cumulative, patents may nonetheless be valuable in
negotiations with other patent owners. Within this context, the rapid product life cycles that
characterize this industry may contribute to an aggressive patenting strategy: by obtaining a patent,
the firm purchases an option to exclude others from using its patented invention (a potentially
valuable asset in negotiations with other patent owners or with users of the technology), while
ensuring the firm’s “freedom to design and manufacture” products using technologies that it
developed. At the same time, the firm is able to secure this legal right to exclude without disclosing
information that would jeopardize the firm’s competitive advantage.
3.2 Changing incentives to patent?12
Without exception, interviewees emphasized that the stronger patent rights ushered in by
the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (CAFC) reshaped the incentives of semiconductor
firms to invest in US patent rights. But the implications of the “pro-patent” shift appeared to differ
among the types of firms in the interview sample, depending on the size and strength of their patent
portfolios in the early 1980s, the extent to which other patent owners could credibly threaten to
exclude the firm from using critical technologies or could extract royalties for use of such
technologies, and somewhat related, whether the firm owns and operates complex manufacturing
facilities or specializes in product design. Despite the small number of firms in the interview
sample, questions about the perceived effects of the early-1980s shift in US patent policies
generated a rich set of general findings. Here, we focus on differences among manufacturers and
design firms, most of which entered the industry during the era of stronger US patent rights.
3.2.1. Large-scale manufacturers: the increased value of patents as bargaining chips
Most of the interviewees from firms operating large-scale manufacturing facilities
emphasized that the formation of the CAFC altered the “rules of the patent game” and increased
their incentives to patent. On the one hand, stronger patent rights increased the ability of some
firms (such as Texas Instruments) to secure income from licensing rights to patents on more
favorable terms. Indeed, interviewees were well aware of the strategies that Texas Instruments had
put in place to manage and to profit from its patent portfolio and representatives from several
manufacturers expected to employ similar strategies as their patent portfolios grew larger. A more
common response among manufacturers, however, was a need to respond to the increased
exclusionary power of other patent owners by investing in patents of their own to use in licensing
or cross-licensing negotiations.
Two events, both related to the change in US patent policies, were frequently mentioned as
important in redirecting the patent strategies of several manufacturers in our sample. First,
numerous interviewees emphasized the importance of Polaroid’s successful patent infringement suit
against Kodak; in 1986, Polaroid was awarded almost $1 billion in damages and Kodak was
barred from competing in the instant-film camera business.
28 The large penalties imposed in this
case and the realization that US courts were willing to take an aggressive stance against
infringement by halting—either temporarily or permanently—production based on infringing
technologies fueled concerns among executives in many firms, including semiconductor
manufacturers. As one interviewee noted, “a preliminary injunction would be detrimental to a firm
if it means shutting down a high-volume manufacturing facility; loss of one week’s production13
alone can cost in the millions of dollars.” The licensing director of another manufacturer noted that
the threat of injunction is indeed a powerful lever against firms in negotiating royalty rates.
The second widely cited reason for the surge in patenting by semiconductor manufacturers
was referred to by some as a “Texas Instruments” effect.
29 Beginning around 1985-6, Texas
Instruments successfully asserted its patents in court for a range of inventions pertaining to
integrated circuits (e.g., the “Kilby patent” on the basic design of the integrated circuit) and
manufacturing methods (e.g., the method for encapsulating chips or transporting wafers from one
manufacturing platform to another). Although the original suits were against non-US firms, the
success of TI’s patents in court enabled the firm to earn higher royalty payments from other firms
in the industry. Others noted that AT&T, IBM, and Motorola also began asserting their patent
rights more aggressively during the 1980s in an attempt to earn increased royalties based on their
large portfolios of semiconductor-related inventions. According to several industry representatives,
these large patent owners increased their charges for rights to infringe their patents during this
period and more actively sought royalty payments from smaller firms.
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According to interviewees from several large manufactures (excluding TI), patents became
more important to their firms during this “pro-patent” environment to use as bargaining chips in
negotiations with other patent owners. Some noted that the semiconductor industry has historically
been characterized by broad, cross-licensing of patent rights among manufacturers and that, to a
large extent, this is still the case. Nonetheless, if a firm lacks a strong patent portfolio of its own
with which to negotiate licensing or cross-licensing agreements, its profits could be eroded quickly
by the outflow of royalty payments to a disparate array of owners of semiconductor-related patent
rights.
31 In response, several interviewees described what appears to be a “race to patent” by their
firms—not a race to win rights to some standalone technological prize, but a race to secure the
right to exclude others before being excluded themselves. This is not to say that patents do not
serve some of their traditional function of safeguarding against outright theft of patented ideas. But
rather, this traditional reason for obtaining patents for several of these manufacturers appeared to
be dwarfed by broader motives.
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Regardless of the underlying motive, several of the manufacturers in our sample were
clearly “ramping up” their patent portfolios and “harvesting” their “latent inventions” to add to
their stock of issued patents. For example, one firm had “shifted from owning a total of 30 patents
[in 1990] to filing over 300 patents in one year” with an internal goal in place to “own 1000
patents by the year 2000.” Another manufacture had set an even more ambitious “1000 by 2000”14
patent goal while maintaining a relatively stable R&D budget: before 1993, the firm typically filed
100 patent applications per year (which rose to 650 patent applications in 1996 to a goal of 1000
applications filed in a single year by 2000). The increased volume of patent filings appeared to
reflect a “deeper reach” into an existing pool of inventions rather than a shift in R&D activities per
se. As one interviewee noted, there were “a lot of patentable inventions sitting around,” but the firm
had simply “not taken the time and incurred the cost” to patent these inventions in the past.
3.2.2. Design firms: securing rights in niche product markets?
The “bargaining chip” role of patents was less prominent in our interviews with the firms
specializing in semiconductor product design. The two highly profitable design firms in our
interview sample had established sophisticated in-house patent committees and were patenting
aggressively in their core product lines. Unlike manufacturers, these firms appeared to be driven by
a desire to secure broad proprietary rights to technologies in niche product markets. Although one
firm was starting to patent for defensive reasons (i.e., in anticipation of future requests from larger
firms for royalty payments), patents were mainly used to improve these firms’ competitive position
against other niche market rivals. The small number of design firms in our interview sample
negotiated surprisingly few licensing agreements involving the sale of rights to infringe their
patented technologies or the acquisition of such rights from others. Put differently, patent rights
appeared to be more important to these firms for “horizontal” reasons (to gain market share from
rival firms) than for “vertical” reasons, such as exchanging know-how or technology with either
suppliers of their manufacturing services or customers (Arora and Fosfuri 1998; Arora 1995). The
primary “vertical” role of patenting for this small group of firms appeared to be in securing capital
from private investors in the start-up phase.
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The overall picture that emerged from the interviews was the importance of patents as an
imperfect but quantifiable measure of technology that enabled technology-based trades to be made
in external markets, both in financial markets (venture capital) and with suppliers and owners of
complementary technologies. Although the sample underpinning these interviews is not necessarily
representative of the industry as a whole, the general insights suggest that the shift in patent
policies in the early 1980s increased the incentives of firms in this industry to patent (with notable
exceptions), albeit for reasons that go beyond those traditionally associated with the patent system
and that differ among types of firms.
4.  Empirical Analysis15
Our empirical study pursues several lines of inquiry. We first establish whether the
increasing patent propensities of firms in this industry simply reflect more general trends observed
in other industries. We reject this view, and find that the patent yield in this industry exhibits a
rather unique pattern since the mid-1980s.
What, then, explains this apparent shift in the determinants of patenting in the
semiconductor industry? We investigate two main hypotheses. The first hypothesis, which we call
“strategic response,” stems from the contractual view of property rights that argues that stronger
patents (and the exclusionary rights that such patents entail) will increase the incentives of firms to
patent for reasons other than the traditional incentives provided by the patent system (Merges and
Nelson 1990; Cohen et al. 1998; Mazzoleni and Nelson 1997). These incentives are particularly
salient in an industry such as semiconductors where the legal rights to semiconductor technologies
are distributed across a diverse array of actors, with each holding important but overlapping pieces
of technologies that they all need. Under such conditions, a firm has an added incentive to obtain
patents simply as “bargaining chips” in negotiations with other patent owners, in gaining access to
needed technologies, or in safeguarding against threats of costly litigation. Because of the nature of
semiconductor manufacturing and the “thicket” of patents that surrounds semiconductor process
technologies, we expect that firms investing heavily in state-of-the-art manufacturing facilities (i.e.,
firms with high capital intensity, as defined below) will be driven by such concerns more than the
firms specializing in product design.
Our second hypotheses, “specialization,” stems from the view that stronger patent rights
have facilitated a “market for know-how exchange” (Merges 1998; Arora 1995; Arora and Fosfuri
1998). If true, we should find that post-1982 entrant firms (i.e., ones that entered the industry
during the “pro-patent” era) rely more heavily on patent protection, controlling for other factors
such as their size, R&D spending, and age.
4.1 Sample Selection and Data
The econometric part of this study is based on the universe of 110 publicly traded U.S.
owned firms whose principal line of business is in SIC 3674 (semiconductors and related devices)
and who have data on Compustat between 1975 and 1996. Because the purpose of this study is to
examine changes in the patenting propensities of semiconductor firms over time, we needed reliable
indicators for both the patented output of semiconductor firms and the semiconductor-related R&D
investments (inputs) of these firms. Corporate R&D spending is reported for a firm’s entire16
portfolio of research activities, so we restricted our sample to firms whose R&D investments are
primarily directed toward technologies aimed at semiconductor-related products.
34 After restricting
the sample to 1976-1996, dropping duplicate observations and partially-owned subsidiaries, and
excluding firms that had less than 3 years of data, we obtained a sample of 97 firms in an
unbalanced panel. The 11 omitted firms were primarily small post-1994 startups for which we had
inadequate data. The sample used for estimation was further restricted to include data only after
1980 (in order to focus on the changes after the creation of the CAFC) and before 1995 (because
of the truncation of the patent data after that date due to lags in the granting of patents). The final
sample includes 679 observations on 72 firms between 1980 and 1994.
A major challenge in any study that examines the patenting activities of firms over time is
identifying which patents are, in fact, owned by a given firm.
35 Firms patent under a variety of
names (their own and those of their subsidiaries) and the Patent Office does not keep a unique
identifier for the same patenting entity from year to year. To construct the entity-level patent
portfolios of the firms in our study, we first retrieved the patent portfolios of the firms included in
the Case Western patent database (discussed in Hall et al. 1998). This database contains the results
of a match between the names of approximately 3,000 manufacturing firms on the Compustat files
to about 30,000 of their subsidiaries (using a 1989 “Who Owns Whom” directory).
Because many of the firms in our study are small and entered the industry since 1989, they
were not included in the Case Western database. Our analysis also extends into the mid-1990s, and
significant mergers and acquisitions have taken place in this industry since 1989. We therefore
constructed updated entity-level portfolios for the firms in our study by identifying name changes,
subsidiaries, and mergers and acquisitions from a variety of sources.
36 These searches generated a
total of 14,365 patents issued to these 97 firms during 1975-1996, for an average of 148 total
patents per firm. In contrast, 228 patents were issued to the 11 omitted firms from 1975-1996, an
average of 21 total patents per firm.
After compiling these entity-level patent portfolios, we retrieved these firms’ detailed
balance sheet and income statement data from Compustat. The resulting “matched” database
combines, for all 97 firms, the front page patent information for their patents that issued during
1975-1996 (e.g., the patent class, when the patent application was filed, the date the patent was
issued) with the information contained in Compustat (e.g., annual R&D spending, capital
expenditures, and sales). In addition, we used business directories and industry sources to identify
the founding date of each firm (which may precede the date for which we have data by many17
years), and to determine whether the firm owned and operated its own fab (manufacturer) or
specialized in product design alone (design firm).
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Table 1 gives some summary statistics for our key variables; the top panel is for our
universe of firms from 1965 to 1997 and the bottom panel is based on the sample we use for
estimation. The median firm in our sample is 27 years old, has approximately 500 employees, does
$5.6 million dollars of R&D (1992$), and successfully applies for one patent a year.
38 However,
the distribution of these variables is quite skewed, with over 500 patent applications in one year for
one firm (Texas Instruments in 1994) and over one billion dollars of R&D (Intel in 1994). Design
firms represent 11 percent of the observations, and 42 percent have no successful patent
applications in a given year. A small number of observations are missing R&D in one or more
years, although all the firms in our sample report R&D in at least some years. To a great extent,
the firms dropped in our cleaning process were younger (often because they actually entered in
1994 or later), smaller, and more likely to be design firms.
4.2 General Trends
 Figure 1 shows the total patent yield for the 110 firms in our sample, together with the
patent yield for all the firms in the Compustat manufacturing sector (firms whose principal SIC is
between 2000 and 3999) and for firms in the other computing and electronics industries for
comparison.
39 It is clear from this graph that something changed around 1986 that caused a rather
steep rise in the patent applications obtained per million dollars of real R&D spending in the
semiconductor industry; note that although the computing sector exhibits a similar rise, it is much
smaller, and the pharmaceutical/biotechnology industry actually shows a decline in the patent-
R&D ratio.
40 Figure 2 shows the number of firms in our estimation sample, which rises smoothly
from 24 at the beginning of the period to 72 in 1994. Design firms represent a fair fraction of
entrants, of which there are 19 by the end of the period.
In Figure 3, we show the same graph as Figure 1, separated into manufacturing and design
(or “fabless”) firms. The trend is similar, but design firms seem to have lower patent yields on
average and the yield does not rise as steeply. We might expect that firms whose R&D is focused
on product rather than process would have a higher rather than a lower propensity to patent.
However, if there are fixed costs of patenting, the smaller design firms may find fewer patents are
worth filing for, other things equal. And, as we have already suggested, if firms file for patents
partly to avoid having production held up because of an intellectual property dispute, then18
manufacturing firms would have a stronger incentive to file than design firms. We will explore this
question later when we estimate equations that describe the propensity of firms to file for patents.
4.3. Estimating the patent production function
To explore the determinants of patenting in these semiconductor firms and how they have
changed in the past one or two decades, we use a patent production function first introduced by
Pakes and Griliches (1980); our specific econometric model was first applied to patent data by
Hausman, Hall, and Griliches (1984). The patent production function relates the number of
successful patent applications made by a firm in a given year to its past history of R&D spending,
along with other firm characteristics such as size.
Because the number of successful patent applications made by a semiconductor firm is
count variable with many zeroes and ones, we use Poisson-based econometric models and
estimation methods. As in Hausman, Hall, and Griliches (1984), we hypothesize that the expected
number of patents applied for during the year is an exponential function of the firm’s R&D
spending and other characteristics Xit:
E[pit|Xit] = lit = exp(Xitb+gt)
where i indexes the firm and t indexes the year. gt is an overall year specific mean that measures the
average patenting rate across all firms, adjusting for the changing mix of firms in the sample. We
estimate this model using maximum likelihood for the Poisson distribution, but we report “robust”
standard errors. Gourieroux, Montfort, and Trognon (1984) have shown that the Poisson model is
in the linear exponential class, so our estimates are consistent if the mean specification is correct.
The robust standard errors are consistent even under misspecification of the distribution. We also
report the results of a Lagrange multiplier test for overdispersion of the negative binomial (2) type
that is due to Cameron and Trivedi (1998) in the tables.
41 Rejection can be interpreted as a
rejection of the pure Poisson model in favor of a model where the variance is proportional to the
mean.
The coefficients from the above model have an elasticity interpretation:
(1/lit ) (dlit/dXit) = b
and the changes in the gits measure the growth of the patenting propensities over time that is not
accounted for by changes in the firm’s characteristics:
Dloglit = Xitb + gt – (Xit-1b + gt-1) = DXitb + gt - gt-119
Therefore, we will focus on the time pattern of the g estimates when we discuss the results of
estimating the patent production function, since we expect there to be considerable residual growth
even after we adjust for the changing characteristics of the firms in the industry.
Traditionally, the most important variable in the patent production function is R&D
spending by the firm, and much of the early work that estimated this model focused on the question
of whether one could measure the lag structure for the production of patents from past R&D
spending.
42 This literature largely concludes that the lag structure is very poorly identified because
of the high within-firm correlation of R&D spending over time. When many lags are included in
the model, the estimate of the sum of the coefficients is roughly the same as the estimated
coefficient of contemporaneous R&D when no lags are included; in addition, most of the
contribution comes from the oldest and the newest R&D lag included. For this reason and because
many of our firms have very short R&D histories, we do not try to estimate the lag structure of the
R&D contribution in this paper, but use only the contemporaneous level of R&D spending in our
specifications.
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A second result in the previous literature on patent production is that when one allows for
permanent differences across firms in the propensity to patent, the sum of the R&D lag coefficients
falls, mostly because the coefficient on the oldest lag becomes insignificant. In the case here, we
are interested in the firm effects themselves, and so we do not want to begin with a model that
sweeps them out. Thus our base specification of the patent production function includes the
following variables:
• R&D spending during the year in which the patents are applied for, deflated
in 1992 dollars, in logarithms.
• The size of the firm, measured as the logarithm of employment. The larger the
firm, the more likely that it will be approached by key patent holders in the industry for a
share of those royalties. In addition, there may be economies of scale in generating patents,
due to the fixed cost of maintaining a legal department that can handle intellectual property
questions (confirmed in our interviews).
• The capital-intensity of the firm, measured as the logrithm of the ratio of
deflated (1992$) plant and equipment to employees (i.e., capital-labor ratio). Capital-
intensive firms may need to “protect themselves” more fully against the threat of litigation
(and the potential risk of preliminary injunctions; see Lanjouw and Lerner 1997), given the
expense of maintaining and operating state-of-the-art semiconductor fabs and the
subsequent costs associated with a halt in production.
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• The age of the firm, measured as its age in 1996, to avoid confounding this
variable with the time effects.
• The type of firm (manufacturer or design firm). Manufacturers need rights to
a broad range of process and product technologies whereas design firms implicitly
purchase process technologies via their manufacturing contracts with foundries.20
• Time dummies, annual, 1980-94.
After presenting the base specification, and discussing the results, we augment our
specification with a series of variables that explore the differences in the patent equation for firms
that entered after 1982, and then for the behavior of all firms after 1982. We add a dummy
variable that is equal to one if the firm was established after 1982, and also interact this variable
with the R&D spending levels and size of the firm. There are 44 such firms in our sample. We
examine whether the post-82 entrants patent more (or less) intensively than the other firms in our
sample (controlling for other firm characteristics).
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4.4 Preliminary Results
Table 2 presents the results of estimating our base specification for 1980-94 using
maximum likelihood methods and the Poisson density function. As should be clear from the above
discussion, the data set is a panel and the unit of analysis is a firm-year. Standard error estimates
robust to heteroskedasticity and misspecification of the distribution are shown in parentheses. The
estimates of the elasticity of patenting with respect to R&D spending in semiconductors alone are
similar to those previously obtained using data for the whole manufacturing sector in the 1970s.
For example, Hausman, Hall, and Griliches (1984) obtained an R&D elasticity of 0.87 (0.004)
using the Poisson distribution and an elasticity of 0.75 (.02) and variance parameter of 0.04
(0.002) using the negative binomial distribution for 128 large firms. Hall, Griliches, and Hausman
(1986) obtained a somewhat lower elasticity of 0.52 for a larger sample of 642 firms. In the latter
case, the log of capital stock was also included in the equation and the total scale coefficient (the
sum of the two coefficients) was 0.66, somewhat closer to our estimate of 0.98.
When we add firm size and capital intensity to the model, the R&D coefficient falls
sharply because of collinearity between the two size measures, R&D and employment, but the total
scale coefficient is about the same (0.99). The explanatory power of the model improves also, with
a substantial increase in the likelihood and a fall in value of the overdispersion test statistic.
Inclusion of the other variables in the model does not affect these basic results.
In column (3) we add the age of the firm, together with dummies for having manufacturing
facilities and for Texas Instruments (TI). It is well-known that Texas Instruments pursues an
aggressive intellectual property strategy, harvesting substantial royalties from its patent portfolio.
TI’s patenting propensity reflects an aggressive IP strategy: the firm obtains an average of 75
percent more patents than other firms in the sample, even controlling for its size and R&D. Texas21
Instruments is an outlier among firms in our sample in several ways—most importantly, it is the
only firm in our sample that had a large patent portfolio (in absolute terms and relative to its R&D
spending) in the early 1980s when US patent rights were strengthened; Texas Instruments is also
more diversified than the other semiconductor manufacturers in our sample.
46 In column (3) and in
the rest of the results in our paper, the patent equation easily passes the overdispersion test, so we
conclude that controlling for the unique nature of TI leaves us with a sample of firms whose
patenting behavior is consistent with the conditional Poisson model (that is, the variance
conditional on firm characteristics is approximately equal to the conditional mean).
Turning to the coefficients of interest, we find that older firms have about a 40 percent
lower patenting propensity when we control for their typically much larger size and R&D
programs, and for the fact that they are more likely to have invested in manufacturing facilities. In
fact, owning a fab also lowers the probability of a patent application, but the result is not
significant. Later on in the paper we show that design firms do indeed seem to have a higher
patenting propensity than manufacturers, once we control for the higher capital-labor ratio of
manufacturing firms.
The estimates in Table 2 yield two striking results. The figure at the bottom of Table 2
plots the year dummies for the 4 sets of estimates, normalized so that they are equal in 1980.
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These estimates make it quite clear that controlling for changes in the mix of semiconductor firms
over time increases rather than reduces the rise in patenting propensity that we saw in Figure 1.
More specifically, these estimates suggest that the patent propensity of the firms in our sample
increased at a steady rate of 10 percent per year after the 1982 introduction of the Court of
Appeals for the Federal Circuit until 1994, for a total increase of approximately 120 percent. In
addition, we find that the age effect is largely due to the fact that post-1982 entrants have a higher
average propensity to patent, all else equal, which directly contradicts the regulatory capture
hypothesis suggested by Kortum and Lerner.
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In Tables 3 and 4, we revisit the question of whether the increase in patenting was driven
by the wave of firms that entered the industry since 1982 or by the behavior of capital-intensive
manufacturers, who are arguably more subject to hold-up threats given their large investments in
fabrication plants. To explore this, we show three variations of the basic specification in Tables 3
(post-1982 entry) and 4 (Manufacturing vs Design Firms): a separate intercept in column (1),
different slopes in column (2), and separate trends in columns (3) and (4).22
In Column 1 of Table 3, we find that post-1982 entrants are, on average, almost 35% more
likely to patent, controlling for other characteristics of these firms. We can explain this fact by
noting that their patent propensity equation (shown in Column 2) is different, in that R&D
investment is a better predictor than capital intensity for these firms. Once we allow for this
difference, the average difference in patenting propensity is insignificant. On the other hand, in
column (3) and in the figure below the table, we see that these entrants have a very different time
pattern in their patenting propensities: they are much higher in the 1986-1991 period, and then fall
back to the level of the other firms in 1992; some of this difference goes away when we allow these
firms to have a separate patent propensity equation (column (4)). We conclude that there is limited
evidence for a higher patenting propensity on the part of more recent entrants, perhaps partly due
to the need for patents in order to secure venture capital financing (which will operate as a
selection mechanism on entry and is quite consistent with entrant firms having a higher but falling
patent propensity over time).
Table 4 provides similar evidence for design firms.
49 Like the post-1982 entrants, roughly
half of which were design firms, these firms have a higher patenting propensity than predicted by
their characteristics and this propensity depends more on R&D intensity and less on capital
intensity (not surprisingly, since they do not invest heavily in manufacturing facilities). A slight
puzzle is that they are 200 percent more likely to patent than predicted by their own patenting
propensity equation. A detailed examination of the data failed to explain this as due to outliers of
some kind, but the result is very imprecise and based on small samples; also, remember that the
raw data gave a lower patenting-R&D ratio for these firms, so apparently our cleaning process
favored design firms with higher patenting propensities (as we would expect if the less successful
firms exited).
Our interpretation of the results in Table 4 is the following: capital intensity is an
important explanatory variable for patenting in manufacturing firms because of the “hold-up”
danger these firms face if they do not have adequate intellectual property protection or at least
adequate defense against the IP protection of other firms for all the key steps in their
manufacturing process. However, it is less important for design firms. When we require both sets
of firms to have the same equation except for the intercepts or time trend, the differences between
them are not very significant (note the chi-squared for the time trends in column 3 of Table 4),
because the equation for the design firms is basically misspecified. When we allow each group to
have its own slope coefficients, we then see a larger difference in patenting propensities between23
manufacturing and design firms, but the sample of design firms is too small for precise
measurement (the chi-squared for differences in the time dummies in column 4 of Table 4 is 27.5
with 8 degrees of freedom, which is significant). Thus, we conclude that the results support both
the idea that capital-intensive firms have increased their patenting to protect their investments in
state-of-the-art manufacturing facilities and that design firms find patenting important to enter
niche markets and secure financing.
5. Exploring alternative hypotheses
In the previous sections, we have demonstrated that a surge in the patent propensities of
semiconductor firms has indeed taken place since the “pro-patent” shift US legal environment in
the early 1980, and that the surge is driven by the aggressive patenting activities of large-scale
manufacturing firms as well as the increased reliance on patents by entrant firms. In our opinion,
these results are consistent with a variant of Kortum and Lerner’s “friendly court” hypothesis, but
one that allows for strategic behavior among firms. Patent rights are inherently a right to exclude.
In an industry where the pace of technology is rapid, innovation is cumulative, and ownership of
the technologies used in production is fragmented across a diverse set of actors, the strengthening
of US patent rights increases the risk that one holder of property rights can effectively exclude, or
“block”, another from using the technology embodied in the patent (Merges and Nelson 1990;
Scotchmer 1991, 1996). This concern is especially salient among firms that have made costly and
rapidly-depreciating investments in wafer fabrication facilities, which inherently utilize a “thicket”
of innovations developed by many parties. In order to obtain the rights to infringe patents held by
external parties and to improve their leverage in negotiations with other patent owners, these firms
amass large portfolios of patents. With the strengthening of US patent rights, the expected benefits
of owning US patents (for offensive and defensive reasons) began to outweigh their expected costs.
Although our empirical results and interviews with firms underline the importance of
stronger patent rights on the increased patent propensities of firms in this industry, we explore
several alternative hypotheses identified in the cross-industry analysis by Kortum and Lerner
(1997). First, if firms have redirected more of their R&D investments toward applied rather than
basic research, we might also see an increased patent yield of R&D dollars over time. There was
little indication from our interviews that such an industry-wide shift occurred in this industry that
would explain the patterns that we observe. We did, however, observe a general belief that it is
remarkably easy for these firms to obtain patent rights from the US Patent and Trademark Office24
and, in the view of most representatives and executives we interviewed, the standards of
patentability have been lowered (especially the standard that an invention must be “non-obvious” in
order to be eligible for a patent award). Although the ease with which firms obtain issued patents
may have increased over time, there is little reason to believe that procedures at USPTO would
disproportionately favor patents in semiconductor-related technologies.
A final explanation for the surge in patenting is that firms have improved their ability to
manage the innovation process and the “productivity of R&D” has therefore improved: R&D
expenditures have remained relatively stable while the patented “output” of that R&D has
increased. Through a process of elimination, Kortum and Lerner (1997) supported the view that
“managerial improvements” (not the “friendly court” or a shift toward applied research)
underpinned the cross-industry increase in US patenting.
Our interviews suggest a very different interpretation of the “managerial improvement”
hypothesis, at least in the semiconductor industry. The surge in patents relative to R&D spending
may indeed reflect important managerial changes, but in how firms manage the R&D output, not
necessarily the R&D input side of the innovation process. For example, most of the firms we
interviewed had overhauled their internal patent procedures during the past 5-10 years by hiring
more in-house patent attorneys, rewarding firms’ engineers with bonuses for patented inventions,
elevating the role of patent attorneys within the firm and expanding their involvement in corporate-
wide activities, (such as strategic alliances, licensing, and litigation decisions), and creating in-
house “patent committees” to oversee, and simplify, the otherwise time-consuming process of
writing, filing, and revising patent applications. Some manufacturers noted that they are
“harvesting” more of their latent inventions, while others noted that they are “ramping up” their
patent filings in order to amass more sizeable patent portfolios. Although the increased
sophistication of design tools may have aided firms’ ability to innovate in the product areas, the
most dramatic alteration in the internal processes appeared to be directed toward the management
of the patent process itself.
The next step in our empirical analysis will test between these “patent” versus “R&D”
productivity hypotheses more explicitly by controlling for changes in the “quality” of these firms’
patents over time (i.e., by examining changes in both the number of claims in these firms’ patent
portfolios over time and in the number of subsequent citations that their patents receive).
50 This
will enable us to test whether firms are applying for an increasing number of “lesser quality”
patents over time (as implied by a “harvesting” strategy whereby firms are patenting a greater25
share of their overall inventions over time), or whether, in fact, the average quality of their patent
portfolios remains constant over time (as implied by an increase in research productivity alone).
6. Conclusion
“One of the more important debates for the rest of this century, as the power and
role of intellectual property enforcement moves to center stage, may well be whether the
incentives created by vigorous enforcement of broad, vaguely defined property rights in
ideas and information outweigh the tendency of such enforcement to discourage new entry
by would-be challengers” (Taylor and Higgins 1994, p.2).
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Our preliminary evidence suggests that the “pro-patent” shift in the 1980s has altered the
patent strategies of semiconductor firms, but in ways that go beyond the “classic” incentives
provided of the patent system. On the one hand, stronger patent rights may have facilitated
specialization in the industry and may well have supported a market for know-how exchange
involving entrant firms (Merges 1996; Arora and Fosfuri 1998). On the other hand, such positive
effects are countered by a socially inefficient process whereby firms amass vast patent portfolios
simply as “bargaining chips.” In essence, a “patent portfolio race” may ensue. In principle, patent
portfolio racing is not an inevitable outcome of strengthening patent rights in cumulative
technological areas. If patent rights were strictly awarded to inventors of “non-obvious”, “useful”,
and “novel” inventions, then it should become increasingly difficult to obtain a patent when a
thicket of prior art exists, and the number of successful patent applications should fall.
It is also clear that there are substantial costs to using the patent system as a means of
ensuring access to the necessary complementary technology. There is the cost of staffing an
internal patent office, the opportunity cost of engineering time and effort, and the direct costs of
filing and maintaining patents once granted. At the same time, there is a dubious overall social gain
to other firms in the industry from the information disclosed in patents related to semiconductor
technologies. An interesting topic for future research is why the exchange of intellectual property in
this industry has evolved in this way, rather than towards the development of shared patent pools.27
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Table 1
Sample Statistics
US Semiconductor Sample before Cleaning
1525 Observations (110 Firms)   1965-1997
Variable Name Mean S.D. Median First Q Third Q Min Max
Patent Applications 11.10 43.68 1 0 4 0 565
R&D ($M 1992)* 4.77 2.14 4.63 0.55 15.05 0 2116.8
Employment (1000s)* 0.645 1.77 0.551 0.192 1.797 0 89.9
P&E per employee* 24.1 0.84 24.0 13.10 43.6 0.8 252.8
   ($1000 1992)
Age of Firm 24.4 12.9 22 13 35 3 60
D(R&D=0) 0.069 (N=105)
D(entered after 1982) 0.298 (N=454)
D(Fabless) 0.199 (N=303)
US Semiconductor Sample Used in Regressions
679 Observations (72 Firms)   1980-1994
Variable Name Mean S.D. Median First Q Third Q Min Max
Patent Applications 17.32 58.38 1 0 7 0 565
R&D ($M 1992)* 4.76 2.21 5.63 0.58 16.75 0 1061.4
Employment (1000s)* 0.624 1.75 0.561 0.185 1.797 0 89.9
P&E per employee* 27.8 0.79 29.5 16.6 48.1 0.8 165.6
   ($1000 1992)
Age of Firm 27.0 11.8 28 16 36 4 60
D(R&D=0) 0.050 (N=34)
D(entered after 1982) 0.168 (N=114)
D(Fabless) 0.108 (N=73)
*Geometric means are shown for these variables, along with the standard deviation of the log.31
Table 2
Patenting Propensity Estimates
US Semiconductor Firms 1980-1994
679 Observations
  Poisson Poisson Poisson Poisson
Variable Name  (1) (2) (3) (4)
 
Log R&D 0.975 (0.042) 0.189 (0.099) 0.141 (0.115) 0.198 (0.112)
  ($1992M)        
Dummy for no reported -1.308 (0.804) -1.744 (0.815) -1.720 (0.820) -1.841 (0.813)
  R&D
Log firm size 0.798 (0.093) 0.798 (0.133) 0.679 (0.114)
   (1000s employees)
Log P&E per employee 0.213 (0.144) 0.380 (0.136) 0.456 (0.150)
  ($1987K)  
Dummy for firms with     -0.309 (0.202) -0.231 (0.236)
  fabrication plants
Log firm age in 1996 -0.484 (0.174)    
  (number of years)
Dummy for post-1982 0.273 (0.200)
  entrants
Dummy (Texas Instruments) 0.746 (0.100) 0.697 (0.100)
Test for overdispersion (p-value)
Log Likelihood -3,897.6 -2,943.2 -2,558.9 -2,595.4
Number of Parameters 17 19 21 21
Chi-squared (p-value) 599.0 (.000)
Heteroskedastic-consistent standard errors are shown in parentheses.
The method of estimation is maximum likelihood for the Poisson model (which is generalized ML for the exponential mean function).
The chi-squared is a Wald test for the specification in the column to the left versus the current column (col.4 is tested vs. col. 2). 
152.0 (.000) 69.7 (.000) 67.2 (.000)






































US Semiconductor Firms 1980-1994
679 Observations
Variable Name  (1) (2) (3) (4)
Pre-1982 Entrants
Intercept year dummies year dummies year dummies year dummies
Log firm size 0.870 (0.030) 0.883 (0.031) 0.877 (0.030) 0.884 (0.030)
   (1000s employees)
Log R&D per employee 0.227 (0.098) 0.129 (0.108) 0.210 (0.098) 0.128 (0.108)
  ($1992 1000s)        
Dummy for no reported -1.566 (0.843) -1.668 (0.850) -1.585 (0.843) -1.664 (0.849)
  R&D
Log P&E per employee 0.429 (0.140) 0.516 (0.150) 0.424 (0.138) 0.495 (0.151)
  ($1992 1000s)  
Dummy for Texas Inst. 0.711 (0.097) 0.676 (0.102) 0.689 (0.095) 0.665 (0.099)
Post-1982 Entrants
Intercept  0.335 (0.178) 0.124 (0.719) year dummies year dummies
 
Log firm size same   0.960 (0.099) same   1.067 (0.116)
  (1000s employees
Log R&D per employee same   0.701 (0.148) same   0.730 (0.144)
  ($1992 1000s)  
Dummy for no reported same   --   same   --  
  R&D
Log P&E per employee same   0.099 (0.197) same   0.210 (0.232)
  ($1992 1000s)    
Test for overdispersion (p-value)
Log Likelihood -2,600.6 -2,561.9 -2,537.6 -2,502.0
Number of Parameters 21 24 28 31
Chi-squared (p-value)   101.4 (.000) 27.0 (.000)
See notes to Table 2. Chi-squared tests are col. 2 vs col. 1, col. 3 vs col. 1, col. 4 vs col. 3.
102.2 (.000)

































Col (3) Pre-82 firms
Col. (3) Post-82 firms
Col (4) Pre-82 firms33
Table 4
Patenting Propensity Estimates
US Semiconductor Firms 1980-1994
679 Observations
Variable Name  (1) (2) (3) (4)
Manufacturing Firm Coefficients
Intercept year dummies year dummies year dummies year dummies
Log firm size 0.863 (0.030) 0.857 (0.031) 0.863 (0.030) 0.857 (0.031)
   (1000s employees)
Log R&D per employee 0.215 (0.113) 0.201 (0.114) 0.215 (0.113) 0.202 (0.114)
  ($1992 1000s)        
Dummy for no reported -1.604 (0.846) -1.645 (0.846) -1.602 (0.846) -1.643 (0.846)
  R&D
Log P&E per employee 0.443 (0.149) 0.467 (0.152) 0.443 (0.149) 0.466 (0.152)
  ($1992 1000s)  
Dummy for Texas Inst. 0.721 (0.101) 0.736 (0.105) 0.721 (0.102) 0.737 (0.105)
Design Firm Coefficients
Intercept  0.366 (0.211) 2.07 (1.98) year dummies year dummies
 
Log firm size same 1.383 (0.164) same   1.431 (0.172)
  (1000s employees
Log R&D per employee same 0.587 (0.313) same   0.598 (0.318)
  ($1992 1000s)  
Dummy for no reported same   --   same   --  
  R&D
Log P&E per employee same   -0.270 (0.312) same   -0.210 (0.296)
  ($1992 1000s)    
Test for overdispersion (p-value)
Log Likelihood -2,606.4 -2,579.3 -2,601.7 -2,572.3
Number of Parameters 21 24 28 31
Chi-squared (p-value)   92.0 (.000) 6.6 (.474)
See notes to Table 2. Chi-squared tests are col. 2 vs col. 1, col. 3 vs col. 1, col. 4 vs col. 3.
110.9 (.000)













































































All Manufacturing (SIC 2000-3999) Semiconductors (SIC 3674)





























Number of Firms Number without Fab Plants36
Figure 3



































Manufacturing Firms Fabless Firms37
First year Last year Sales in R&D in  Granted 1994 Total Patents
CUSIP Name of Firm of data of data 1994 ($M) 1994 ($M) Patent Apps. thru 1996
882508 TEXAS INSTRUMENTS INC 1965 1997 10315.0 689.00 565 7433
637640 NATIONAL SEMICONDUCTOR CORP 1967 1997 2379.4 283.10 190 1545
458140 INTEL CORP 1973 1997 11521.0 1111.00 311 1365
007903 ADVANCED MICRO DEVICES 1973 1997 2134.7 279.98 125 1082
595112 MICRON TECHNOLOGY INC 1976 1997 1628.6 83.40 74 698
918270 VLSI TECHNOLOGY INC 1982 1997 587.1 79.59 75 420
032654 ANALOG DEVICES 1970 1997 773.5 106.87 63 377
502161 LSI LOGIC CORP 1982 1997 901.8 98.98 74 302
460254 INTL RECTIFIER CORP 1965 1997 328.9 16.38 13 169
235204 DALLAS SEMICONDUCTOR CORP 1984 1997 181.4 22.65 13 165
122574 BURR-BROWN CORP 1975 1997 194.2 21.85 1 141
827079 SILICONIX INC 1975 1997 196.5 15.78 16 114
983919 XILINX INC 1984 1997 355.1 45.32 32 96
020753 ALPHA INDS 1967 1997 78.3 3.26 2 91
021441 ALTERA CORP 1984 1997 198.8 45.99 19 91
989524 ZILOG INC 1972 1997 223.3 23.05 11 89
535678 LINEAR TECHNOLOGY CORP 1976 1997 200.5 18.39 7 80
232806 CYPRESS SEMICONDUCTOR CORP 1984 1997 406.4 53.19 25 75
458118 INTEGRATED DEVICE TECH INC 1982 1997 422.2 78.38 13 73
170021 CHIPS & TECHNOLOGIES INC 1974 1997 73.4 11.79 4 67
913283 UNITRODE CORP 1965 1997 97.1 9.43 7 64
114577 BROOKTREE CORP 1984 1995 109.0 26.13 3 51
049513 ATMEL CORP 1987 1997 375.1 43.03 8 48
300645 EXAR CORP 1974 1997 159.5 14.38 3 40
89674K TRIQUINT SEMICONDUCTOR INC 1984 1997 29.2 9.94 0 39
232815 CYRIX CORP 1989 1996 246.1 24.75 10 38
518415 LATTICE SEMICONDUCTOR CORP 1985 1997 144.1 22.86 1 34
69344F SIERRA SEMICONDUCTOR CORP 1986 1997 108.6 28.62 16 33
984903 XICOR INC 1979 1997 103.4 14.09 1 32
413136 HARMON INDUSTRIES INC 1974 1997 119.7 4.56 3 31
103025 BOWMAR INSTRUMENT CORP 1971 1997 27.8 0.59 2 31
57772K MAXIM INTEGRATED PRODUCTS 1985 1997 153.9 22.56 8 30
595017 MICROCHIP TECHNOLOGY INC 1987 1997 208.0 20.75 8 25
815779 SEEQ TECHNOLOGY INC 1981 1997 21.5 3.28 1 24
751907 RAMTRON INTERNATIONAL CORP 1989 1997 20.4 16.45 12 23
527295 LEVEL ONE COMMUNICATIONS INC 1989 1997 46.8 9.96 4 22
834256 SOLITRON DEVICES INC 1973 1996 6.3 0.00 0 20
477178 JETRONIC INDUSTRIES INC 1967 1997 21.9 0.03 0 19
594793 MICREL INC 1988 1997 35.9 3.79 5 19
553649 MSI ELECTRONICS INC 1977 1997 1.1 0.11 0 17
541402 LOGIC DEVICES INC 1976 1997 13.5 1.66 1 17
00754E ADVANCED PHOTONIX INC  -CL A 1985 1997 6.8 1.85 1 16
909149 UNIPHASE CORP 1980 1997 32.9 3.06 3 16
449693 IMP INC 1982 1997 59.8 7.19 3 15
868532 SUPERTEX INC 1977 1997 31.8 4.43 0 14
148881 CATALYST SEMICONDUCTOR INC 1988 1996 48.8 4.25 2 13
928497 VITESSE SEMICONDUCTOR CORP 1988 1997 35.6 8.79 0 13
254547 DIONICS INC 1973 1997 1.3 0.03 0 10
007768 AEROFLEX INC 1974 1997 65.6 0.69 0 9
01877H ALLIANCE SEMICONDUCTOR CORP 1992 1997 119.3 8.37 6 9
594850 MICRO LINEAR CORP 1987 1997 41.7 9.21 3 9
683960 OPTI INC 1991 1997 134.1 8.76 0 8
404160 HEI INC 1977 1997 17.3 0.63 0 7
829204 SIMTEK CORP 1984 1997 1.2 0.82 0 6
595137 MICROSEMI CORP 1976 1997 119.2 0.92 1 5
816629 SEMICON INC 1976 1997 6.7 0.20 0 5
450909 IBIS TECHNOLOGY INC 1989 1997 3.2 1.24 1 5
683815 OPTEK TECHNOLOGY INC 1981 1997 55.6 0.58 1 3
Table A.1
Sample of Firms used in Regressions - US Semiconductor Manufacturing (SIC 3674)38
First year Last year Sales in R&D in  Granted 1994 Total Patents
CUSIP Name of Firm of data of data 1994 ($M) 1994 ($M) Patent Apps. thru 1996
45811K INTEGRATED CIRCUIT SYSTEMS 1985 1997 93.8 10.65 0 3
594946 MICROELECTRONIC PACKAGING 1989 1997 42.4 1.73 0 2
237887 DATA SYSTEMS & SOFTWARE INC 1973 1997 79.7 2.91 0 2
553477 MRV COMMUNICATIONS INC 1983 1997 17.5 2.14 0 2
747277 QLOGIC CORP 1991 1997 57.7 7.60 0 2
248719 DENSE-PAC MICROSYSTEMS INC 1984 1997 11.5 0.58 0 2
88554L THREE-FIVE SYSTEMS INC 1989 1997 85.5 1.27 0 1
895919 TRIDENT MICROSYSTEMS INC 1992 1997 69.1 9.56 1 1
449180 HYTEK MICROSYSTEMS INC 1982 1997 4.2 0.65 0 1
68556E ORBIT SEMICONDUCTOR INC 1993 1995 43.5 2.34 0 0
595135 MICROPAC INDUSTRIES INC 1977 1997 9.4 0.32 0 0
816850 SEMTECH CORP 1975 1997 25.8 0.88 0 0
05548E BKC SEMICONDUCTORS INC 1991 1997 11.4 0.16 0 0
989601 ZING TECHNOLOGIES INC 1985 1997 11.5 0.84 0 0
Notes to table:
Sales and R&D are in millions of 1994 dollars.
Beginning and end years are for our dataset, not for the lifetime of the firm.
Granted patents in 1994 are the patents applied for in 1994 that have been granted by 1996.
The patent total is all the patents granted to our firms that were applied for after the beginning year and granted by 1996 .
Table A.1 (continued)39
Table A.2: Description of Firms in Interview Sample
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1 The 1994 “Carnegie-Mellon” survey found that patents were a relatively ineffective way to
capture returns from R&D dollars to firms in all but a handful of industries (e.g., pharmaceuticals,
chemicals and medical devices), which was consistent with earlier works in this field (Levin et al. 1987;
Scherer 1959; Mansfield 1986).
2 These surveys, their findings, and their methodologies are discussed in Section 2 of the paper.
3 For example, the number of US patents that pertain to semiconductor devices and manufacture
in 1994 was more than twice the number of patents issued in 1981 that belonged the same set of narrowly-
defined semiconductor classes (USPTO, 1995). By contrast, the number of US patents issued in all classes
in 1994 was only 50% greater than that issued in 1981. This disproportionate rise in semiconductor
patents is similarly revealed in more recent years: the number of US patents issued that involved these
semiconductor technologies rose by 34.5% from 1990 to 1994, while the number of US patents issued as a
whole rose by only 13.8% between these same years.
4 The numbers in Figure 1 were compiled from several sources described in Section 4 below.
5 See Hausman, Hall, and Griliches (1984) and Hall, Griliches, and Hausman (1986), also
discussed in Section 4.
6 In contrast, Kortum and Lerner examine the increase in patenting activity in particular classes
(e.g., software and biotechnology) and then look at aggregate trends in R&D intensity across the US and
other national economies. As such, they can not control for whether the increased patenting activity in
certain areas is simply due to a simultaneous increase in R&D spending directed towards those areas (in
which case, the propensity to patent in such areas has remained unchanged). Using a different approach,
Cohen et al. (1997) construct a “patent propensity” measure based on the responses of firms to questions
on the 1994 Carnegie-Mellon survey. As such, the authors are able to construct a useful estimate of firms’
propensity to patent at one point in time, but are unable to explicitly track changes in this important
variable over time for the firms in their survey.
7 See Reinganum (1989) for a review of the patent races literature. O’Donoghue (1998) provides
an overview of the more recent literature that examines the role of patents when innovation is cumulative.
8 In our small sample of interviewed firms, some manufacturers also were “ramping up” their
portfolios with the expectation that they would reap more direct benefits from these investments in the
future. Most firms were well aware the billions in revenues earned by Texas Instruments from simply
licensing rights to its vast patent portfolio.
9 In contrast, Arora and Fosfuri (1998) assert that strong patent rights (in general) facilitated the
creation of a “market for know-how exchange” between specialized engineering firms (SEFs) and large
chemical manufacturers. An interesting distinction exists between the “specialized” firms examined by
Arora and Fosfuri and the ones in our sample: unlike the SEFs, the firms in our study specialized in
product, not process, innovation. As discussed below, the entry of the semiconductor design firms in our
study was based on the adoption of a standard process used in semiconductor manufacturing and the
ability of these firms to contract manufacturing services from so-called “foundry providers” (see Macher et
al., 1998). Our interviews suggested that the primary importance of strong patent rights to these design
firms was horizontal, not vertical, in nature: that is, strong patent rights appeared to be more important to
these firms in staking out and defending their market share against other niche-market rivals than they
were in managing their vertical contracts with manufacturing suppliers.
10 The 1980 Supreme Court decision (Dawson Chemical Co. v. Rohm & Haas, 448 U.S. 176,
221) ushered in a series of court rulings that were more favorable to patent owners. For example, in SCM
Corp v. Xerox Corp (645 F.2d 1195, 1206, 2d Cir. 1981), the District Court ruled that it was lawful to
acquire patents, even if those rights were acquired with the intent of dominating a market should the
products prove successful: “If the threat of treble damages liability for refusing to license were imbedded
in the minds of potential patent holders as a likely prospect incident to every successful commercial
exploitation of a patented invention, the efficacy of the economic incentive afforded by our patent system
might be severely diminished.”
11 The 1984 National Cooperative Research Act reduced the antitrust penalties for collaboration
among firms in “pre-commercial” research. In 1993, the NCRA was extended to cover joint production41
                                                                                                                                                      
ventures.
12 “Mask work protection” is sui generis in that it is neither a patent law nor a copyright law, but
combines features of both (Keustermans and Arckens, 1994: 10-3). Owners may register their mask works
with the US Copyright office for a nominal fee ($20 in 1994) in return for roughly 10 years of exclusive
rights to reproduce, sell, and import semiconductors based on the layout design. Although this form of
protection may protect against outright theft or unauthorized reproduction and use mask works, several
changes over the past decade have undermined the effectiveness of this form of IP protection. Modern
designs are so complex that low-cost copying of masks has become largely impractical (e.g., it is no longer
possible to simply photocopy the layout design). Design tools also have become increasingly sophisticated,
obviating the need to steal another firm’s mask work (Lewis, 1995: p. 566).
13 From the trust-busting era of the 1920-1930s through much of the 1970s, patents were largely
viewed as anti-competitive weapons used by monopolists to stifle entry and to bar competition: “it was
difficult to get a patent upheld in many federal circuit courts, and the circuits diverged widely both as to
the doctrine and basic attitudes toward patents. As a consequence, industry downplayed the significance of
patents” (Merges 1997: p. 12).
14Until 1982, twelve regional circuit courts had appellate jurisdiction over patent cases: “certain
courts of appeals were believed to favor patentees, others were considered sympathetic to infringers.
 This
gave rise to “forum shopping”—prelitigation strategies and gamesmanship—directed to getting the
litigation before a regional circuit court that would be most sympathetic to one’s case” (Nies, 1993: p.
798).
15 In 1984, the CAFC established that the challenger of patent validity must meet a “clear and
convincing evidentiary standard,” which increased the burden on challengers seeking to invalidate a
16 Evidence on court rulings further demonstrates the importance of this 1982 reform: “between
1953 and 1978, circuit courts affirmed 62 percent of district court decisions holding patents to be valid
and infringed and reversed 12 percent of the decisions holding patents to be invalid or not infringed. In
the years 1982-90, the CAFC affirmed 90 percent of district court decisions holding patents to be valid
and infringed and reversed 28 percent of the judgements of invalidity or noninfringement” (Lerner, 1995:
p. 469; citing evidence from several sources).
17 See, for example, Lerner (1995); Lanjouw and Schankerman (1997); Kortum and Lerner
(1997); and Cohen et al. (1997).
18 Economists have long analyzed the optimal design of the patent mechanism, emphasizing the
tradeoff between creating incentives to conduct R&D and the monopoly distortions associated with strong
patents. See Reinganum (1989) for a review of this extensive literature. Early work in this field typically
assumed that a patent provided firms a standalone technological “prize” over the resulting product or
process invention; indeed, a concern was that firms would engage in socially wasteful “patent races” and
conduct duplicative R&D when patent rights were too strong. Recent studies have advanced the patent-
design literature by investigating the R&D incentives provided by patents when innovation is cumulative,
rather than discrete, in nature (Scotchmer, 1991, 1996; Green and Scotchmer, 1995; Scotchmer and
Green, 1990; O’Donoghue et al., 1998; and O’Donoghue, 1998).
19 Patenting in the chemical-based industries is inherently better-defined, given the precision
with which molecules can be specified, and products such as new drugs typically embody far fewer
patented innovations than those embodied in a new semiconductor chip.
20 More than one interviewee mentioned the “demonstration” effect of the Kodak-Polaroid
decision on instant cameras. One pointed out that up until that time, infringing firms expected only to
have to pay royalties on past use of the property covered by the infringed patent (a reasonable risk and
slightly less expensive in an expected value sense than paying royalties in the beginning), whereas after
Kodak-Polaroid firms perceived that they could be shut down with an injunction rather than simply
paying the infringed firm.
21 What Cohen et al. report is the average percentage of product or process innovations for which
the appropriability mechanism is effective; we have turned them into ranks. The percentages for patents
are 31 (product) and 25 (process). It is interesting that when we asked the patent counsel of a large42
                                                                                                                                                      
semiconductor manufacturing firm for the same numbers, he gave 80 percent for both.
22 Judging from the survey layout, the other 3 probably had not applied for patents for their R&D
unit during the past three years, so they skipped this section.
23 In total, we met with representatives from 7 semiconductor firms between April 1998 and
November 1998. In each case, we asked to meet with someone with direct responsibility for formulating
and implementing the firm’s patent strategy. Identifying relevant decision makers was straightforward for
small firms: we typically met with someone with a legal/engineering background who was in charge of the
firm’s patenting activities; in one case, we met with the firm’s CEO. For larger firms, we typically met
with 2 or more persons, including in-house patent or corporate attorneys, patent licensing executives, or
R&D lab managers. In order to gain additional views on whether the firms in our sample are
representative of industry-wide or cross-industry trends, we also met with attorneys who advise firms in
the semiconductor and other industries on their use of patents in responding to litigation or in negotiating
licensing agreements.
24 In the semiconductor industry, manufacturing takes place in wafer fabrication facilities, or
“fabs.” Since the early 1980s, a wave of so-called “fabless” firms have entered the industry. These firms
specialize in chip design and innovative products, and are “fabless” in the sense that they subcontract
wafer fabrication services from other firms (Macher et al. 1998).
25 Because of their pivotal roles in setting industry-wide norms in the patent and patent licensing
arena, Texas Instruments and Intel were included in our interview sample. We are treating the names of
the remaining firms as confidential, pending approval from interview participants.
26 See, for example, Scherer et al. (1959), Mansfield (1986), Levin et al. (1987) and Cohen et al.
(1997).
27 As the licensing director of one firm noted, it takes roughly 5 years for a manufacturing
method to become diffused throughout the industry. To the extent that billion-dollar fabrication facilities
are based on that method, a process-related patent may be far more valuable to the firm in licensing
income than the original products for which the process was developed. The cross-generational benefits of
patents were also emphasized by an interviewee from a successful design firm. In this case, the design
firm had asserted its patent rights based on prior-generation technology against a rival firm. In addition to
the damages that the firm expects to receive, bringing the suit to trial was viewed as a strategic decision
aimed at (1) making buyers more reluctant to purchase the rival’s potentially-infringing products; and (2)
diverting the rival’s engineering and managerial efforts. In this case, the interviewee expected that the
successful litigation over older technologies could improve his firm’s chances of having its next-
generation product adopted as the industry standard.
28 See Barton and Parapatt (1998) for additional information on the Polaroid-Kodak dispute.
29 A third “demonstration effect” was also widely noted, as implied by some of the examples
discussed below. More specifically, several interviewees from manufacturing firms noted that top
management in their firms redirected significant funds and resources into the patent department—but
only the firm had faced direct losses as a consequence of patent infringement suits or had been unable to
settle licensing or cross-licensing agreements on favorable terms. Interviewees from design firms also
noted a general tendency of firms to “ramp up” patenting following their first patent-related lawsuit.
Although the general environment of patent litigation is recognized by the firm, some noted that there is
considerable uncertainty over when and whether the firm would face a detrimental suit itself. In the
meantime, several interviewees noted a reluctance of top managers in their firms to redirect time and
effort away from the engineering efforts on which the profits from the current generation of products are
derived.
30 Although not mentioned in our interviews, it is important to realize that the overall size of the
semiconductor market had grown considerably during this period. For example, from 1980 to 1990,
worldwide semiconductor sales had increased from $13.6 to $57.5 billion (ICE Status Report, 1998). This
growth in overall semiconductor sales may have heightened the incentives of some patent owners to seek
sales-based royalties during this period.
31 Several interviewees remarked that the most difficult negotiating position is against firms in
unrelated industries that do not seek reciprocal exchange of technology and, more troublesome,43
                                                                                                                                                      
independent inventors (such as Gilbert Hyatt or Jerome Lemelson) who have asserted their patents
successfully in court and are only interested in a one-way transfer of royalty payments from the firm.
32 Although some licensing agreements are negotiated using a list of the firm’s “proud patents”
(Grindley and Teece, 1997), according to the industry representatives with whom we met, firms
occasionally find patents so difficult to value that some cross-licensing negotiations are conducted using
patent counts as the unit of currency. Clearly, to the extent that this practice is widespread, there is a
considerable incentive to apply for patents on minor innovations that have no other intrinsic value.
33 A separate interview with a member of the board of a recent start-up firm highlighted the
salience of these views. The design firm, which was established in 1994 and is still privately held, spends
over $360,000 a year on patenting, or almost 40% of its annual revenues. According to the board member
interviewed, investors demanded that the firm acquire strong patent rights at an early stage in order to
increase its leverage against future rivals and to reduce the likelihood that the small management and
engineering team would become distracted with patent infringement suits brought against the firm.
34 As discussed in the introduction, the obvious drawback to this approach is that it excludes
“systems” manufacturers, such as AT&T, Motorola, or IBM, that are important owners (and users) of
semiconductor-related intellectual property but whose R&D investments are broader in scope (e.g.,
directed towards telecommunications or computer technologies more generally). We excluded non-US
firms (e.g., Hitachi or Samsung) for similar difficulties in obtaining reliable semiconductor R&D
investments for these firms; the patent propensities of non-US firms may also be driven by institutional
factors of their home countries, which are beyond the scope of our study.
35 See, for example, discussion in Hall, Jaffe, Trajtenberg (1998).
36 We identified name changes and 1998 subsidiary information from Standard and Poor’s
“Corporate Descriptions Plus News” database available on Lexis-Nexis. Some firms were acquired or went
bankrupt during the period of our study and were therefore not listed in current business directories. In
this event, we retrieved the relevant information from the last available 10-K filed by the firm. We
identified 1994 and 1989 subsidiaries of large firms by using the Directory of Corporate Affiliations
(“Who Owns Whom”); for smaller firms, we obtained the list of 1994 and 1989 subsidiaries from the list
of subsidiaries (typically, Exhibit 21) filed with each firm’s annual 10-K report. Finally, we identified all
major mergers and acquisitions involving these firms from 1984 to 1998 using several databases and
directories available on Lexis-Nexis, including: the Financial Times Mergers and Acquisitions Database,
the IDD United States M&A Transactions database, and the “news” portion of “Standard and Poor’s
Corporate Description Plus News” database.
37 We used the business directories on Lexis-Nexis (discussed above) to identify the year in which
each firm was established. To determine whether a firm was a manufacturer or not, we used 1997 industry
data provided by Integrated Circuit Engineering, Inc. (ICE) in which a firm is classified as “fabless” if the
majority of its wafers are manufactured by other parties. Because some of our firms had manufacturing
capabilities at one time but had divested them by 1997, we supplemented these data by examining
previous 10-Ks for each firm.
38 As discussed below, these data include information on these firms’ successful patent
applications (i.e., applications for which patents are eventually granted). Information on unsuccessful US
patent applications (i.e., ones that do not result in issued US patents) is not publicly available in the
United States.
39 The ratio of the total number of successful patent applications in the sector to the total R&D
spending in the sector is plotted rather than the average of the patent-R&D ratios for each firm, to avoid
the noise introduced by outlier observations with very small R&D programs. This procedure is equivalent
to plotting a weighted patent-R&D ratio where the weights are the size of the R&D program.
40 In order to avoid confounding our patenting measure with the variable lags in processing in the
US Patent and Trademark Office, we date our patents by the date of application, although we consider
only patents that eventually issue. We have all patents that issue by 1997, so our patent numbers are not
quite complete in the later years. For this reason, we stop most of our analysis in 1994, because 1995
appears to be the first year in which truncation due to the issue lag is visible.44
                                                                                                                                                      
41 All the estimates in the paper were obtained using the POISSON procedure in TSP Version
4.5. See the TSP Reference Manual (1999) for details on the estimation strategy. The results have been
benchmarked against published results in Cameron and Trivedi (1998).
42 In addition to Pakes and Griliches (1981) and Hausman, Hall, and Griliches (1984), see Hall,
Griliches, and Pakes 1986. For work that explores the econometric specification and estimation of this
equation, see Garcia-Montalvo (1997) and Blundell, Griffith, and Windmeijer (1997).
43 In fact, experimentation with lag structures using these data confirmed the results in the earlier
literature, and also revealed that controlling for the age of these firms was sufficient to knock out any
effects of R&D spending prior to the year in which the patents were applied for.
44 A new semiconductor fabrication plant now requires a capital investment of more than $1.5
billion (ICE 1998).
45 Ideally, we wish to test whether the patent propensities of the post-82 entrant firms are greater
than the patent propensities of entrant firms in the preceding period. We will explore whether we have
enough observations with reliable R&D data between 1975 and 1982 to make this more direct
comparison.
46 Unlike firms such as Intel or AMD that only sell semiconductors, Texas Instruments sells a
broader range of electronic products (e.g., watches or calculators). However, TI is still primarily a
semiconductor firm. According to TI’s 1998 10-K report, semiconductor products comprised 83 percent of
47 That is, gt - g1980 is plotted.
48 However, as we discussed earlier, there are some good reasons to think that patenting by small
entrants may be a direct response to threats from incumbents, at least in this industry, which seems to us
to be in the spirit of the regulatory capture hypothesis.
49 Although the results are superficially similar for the entrant/incumbent and
design/manufacturing split, in fact these splits do not do the same thing. Here is the two way table for the
observations in our sample:










50 Controlling for changes in the quality of these firms’ patent portfolios is important because it
will enable us to test whether the recent surge in patenting reflects a rise in the R&D productivity of these
firms (in which case we would not expect a decline in quality), or whether the propensities of these firms
to patent has simply risen over time (in which case we might expect the average quality of these firms’
patents to decline).
51 Indeed, the recent antitrust case brought against Intel Corporation by the Federal Trade
Commission deals with precisely these issues, and may represent a swing of the pendulum in away from
“pro-patent” US legal environment of the past two decades. More specially, the FTC filed an antitrust
complaint against Intel in June 1998, claiming that Intel had denied three computer companies—Compaq
Computer, Digital Equipment, and Intergraph—access to technical information they needed to develop
computer systems based on Intel chips. A pivotal issue in the case is whether Intel had the right to refuse
these companies licenses to key patents owned by Intel or whether Intel’s intellectual property is an
“essential facility” for these companies given Intel’s dominance in the microprocessor market (See L.
The Financial Times, June 9, 1998: 1; and L. Kehoe, “Intel
Rejects Monopoly Charges,” The Financial Times, July 14, 1998: 4).